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Abstract 
Blockchain technology has been raising enthusiasm over a variety of disciplines, from information             
technology and finance, to law and economics. Blockchain is a decentralized ledger, which             
facilitates trust and makes peer-to-peer transactions possible without a central third-party authority.            
Since 2008, cryptocurrency bitcoin has provided ​an example of how to implement a marketplace              
without a central authority by using blockchain technology​. The fact that a broad range of               
economic and government activities rely on a centralized recording of the basic data of the               
economy makes this technology potentially significant. The utopian views of blockchain have            
argued​ ​that​ ​it​ ​will​ ​disrupt​ ​a​ ​wide​ ​range​ ​of​ ​markets​ ​by​ ​eliminating​ ​the​ ​need​ ​for​ ​intermediation.  
The objective of this thesis is to review the relevant literature related to the topic and provide a                  
guide to what blockchain means in the field of economics. The published research is mapped               
through a three stage literature review, and based on this, it is organized in three main categories:                 
monetary-,​ ​innovation-​ ​and​ ​governance-centred​ ​research.  
Even though the literature surrounding the topic is still in its infancy, the potential of blockchain                
technologies is recognized by the literature. From the monetary viewpoint blockchain gives            
unprecedented flexibility in designing the attributes of currencies in terms of supply, value and              
exchange. From the innovation viewpoint, blockchain can create both increased efficiency of            
existing markets but also profits through entirely new markets. From the governance viewpoint             
blockchain facilitates trust and can be instrumental in democratizing economy more towards            
peer-to-peer​ ​production​ ​and​ ​consumption.  
Rather than a single technology, blockchain should be understood as a part of a greater digital                
transformation. In this case, blockchain can play a role in unlocking the potential of digital               
commons as well as the sharing and platform economy through a decentralized, universal             
record-keeping​ ​system.  
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Economics,​ ​New​ ​Institutional​ ​Economics,​ ​Economics​ ​of​ ​Innovation 
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Tiivistelmä 
Lohkoketju (blockchain) on herättänyt kiinnostusta useilla tieteenaloilla, aina        
informaatioteknologiasta ja rahoituksesta oikeus- ja taloustieteeseen. Kyseessä on hajautettu         
tietokanta, joka välittää luottamusta verkon yli ja mahdollistaa transaktiot ilman keskitettyä           
kolmatta osapuolta. Vuodesta 2008 eteenpäin kryptovaluutta bitcoin osoitti, että markkinapaikan          
luominen ilman kolmatta luotettua osapuolta on mahdollista lohkoketjun avulla. Lohkoketjusta          
potentiaalisesti merkittävän teknologian tekee se, että valtaosa taloudellisista ja hallinnollisista          
toiminnoista perustuu keskitettyihin tietokantoihin. Utopistisimmat näkökulmat lohkoketjuun       
väittävätkin sen mullistavan laajan joukon markkinoita poistamalla tarpeen kolmansille         
osapuolille.  
Tämän tutkielman tavoite on käydä läpi taloustieteen näkökulmasta oleellinen lohkoketjua          
koskeva kirjallisuus ja tarjota siten yhteenveto, mitä lohkoketju potentiaalisesti tarkoittaa          
taloustieteessä. Julkaistu lohkoketjua käsittelevä taloustieteen tutkimus kartoitetaan       
kolmivaiheisen kirjallisuuskatsauksen kautta sekä jaetaan tämän perusteella kolmeen        
pääkategoriaan:​ ​raha-,​ ​innovaatio-​ ​ja​ ​hallintokeskeiseen​ ​tutkimukseen. 
Vaikka lohkoketjua käsittelevä kirjallisuus on vasta alkutekijöissään, teknologian potentiaali on          
selkeästi tunnistettu. Rahataloustieteen näkökulmasta erityisen kiinnostavaa on se, että         
lohkoketju avaa ennennäkemättömän joustavuuden digitaalisen rahan suunnittelussa.       
Innovaatiokeskeisestä näkökulmasta lohkoketju puolestaan oletettavasti sekä tehostaa nykyisten        
markkinoiden toimintaa että luo kokonaan uusia markkinoita. Hallinnollisesta näkökulmasta         
lohkoketju välittää luottamusta ja edesauttaa talouden demokratisoitumista kohti vertaistuotantoa         
-kulutusta.  
Yksittäisen teknologian sijaan lohkoketju tulee ymmärtää osana suurempaa muutosta kohti          
digitaalista taloutta ja yhteiskuntaa. Tässä tapauksessa lohkoketjulla voi olla merkittävä rooli niin            
digitaalisten yhteisten resurssien hyödyntämisessä kuin myös jakamis- ja alustatalouden         
potentiaalin​ ​realisoimisessa​ ​universaalin​ ​ja​ ​hajautetun​ ​kirjanpitojärjestelmän​ ​myötä.  
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Key Concepts
Blockchain = decentralized ledger of records and transactions (defined more
specifically in chapter 3)
Ledger = collection of transactions and accounts
Blockchain network = network of peers who are using and maintaining the
blockchain network
Mining = the procedure through which new information is added to the blockchain
and new digital money is issued
Bitcoin = decentralized digital currency, i.e. cryptocurrency, that runs on the
blockchain technology
Digital Currency = digital representation of value
Cryptocurrency = a digital currency that does not need any intermediaries
in order to perform electronic transactions
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1 Introduction
The blockchain technology has been raising enthusiasm over a variety of disci-
plines, from information technology and finance, to law and economics. Blockchain
became known as the backbone technology for the cryptocurrency bitcoin. How-
ever, blockchain is much more than just the innovation behind bitcoin. It is a
decentralized ledger enabling peer-to-peer transactions among people who have
no particular trust on each other. It is certainly one of the most interesting
recent technological developments due to its potentially disruptive features.
The significance of this new technology lies in the fact that a broad range of
economic activities rely on centralized, agreed-upon recording of basic data of
the economy: registries of assets, exchange, identities, contracts, value and so
on. So far, the governance and authentication of this information has been
reliant on centralized systems, including banks, firms, and governmental insti-
tutions. However, blockchain has proved its potential to facilitate exchange and
disseminate trust without a neutral third-party authority. Established in 2008,
bitcoin has been the first example of how to implement a marketplace without
a central authority through blockchain technology. Since then, blockchain has
gained attention due to its potential impact on the ways to organize information
and interactions of groups of people.
Blockchain is becoming a buzzword due to lack of clear terminology, making
it hard to construct a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon. The utopian
views of blockchain have argued that it will disrupt all markets by eliminat-
ing the need for intermediation. More realistically, Catalini and Gans (2016)
argue that blockchain is “more likely to change the scope of intermediation”
through reduction of transaction costs and by allowing new types of market-
places to emerge. Altogether, there is a need for a clearer conceptualization of
what blockchain means in the field of economics, and for understanding what
the possible economic and institutional implications of this new technology are.
1.1 (De)centralization
Adam (1759) argued that open and decentralized systems lead to evolutionary
efficiency in complexity. However, systems tend to centralize for several reasons.
First, the centralization of governance improves efficiency in establishing and
enforcing rules and solving disputes. Second, a neutral centralized third-party
intermediary disseminates trust between economic agents. Third, centraliza-
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tion eases the accumulation of knowledge, creating knowledge structures and
enabling scale economies. Fourth, centralization simplifies the coordination of
actions, and thereby prevents unnecessary duplication.
As centralized systems grow in size and complexity, they become inefficiently
expensive. Large and complex centralized systems are less resilient, robust,
flexible, secure and efficient. The marginal cost of centralization increases as
complexity and scale grow.
Blockchain is a technology for crating trust and consensus of records and trans-
actions, which are instrumental to economic coordination. This could make
decentralization relatively efficient compared to centralization. Blockchain lets
people who have no particular confidence in each other collaborate without hav-
ing to go through a neutral central authority.
1.2 Research Objectives and Research Question
This thesis provides an overview and analysis of the relevant published work
related to the topic and to provide a guide to what blockchain means in the
field of economics. The overview can be used by academia and decision-makers
as an up-to-date report on the current state of the field. It can also make it
easier for further researchers to construct a comprehensive picture of the topic.
The main research question of this thesis is: “What are the possible economic
and institutional implications of blockchain?”
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis starts with an overview of the literature review. Chapter 3 defines
what blockchain means in the field of economics. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 summa-
rize, discuss and interpret each of the three approaches, monetary-, innovation-
and governance-centred approaches. Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the
findings and suggests directions for the future research.
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2 Overview of the Literature
The objective of this literature review is to give an overview of the published
literature related to the economics of blockchain and to assort and structure the
literature in a meaningful way. Through a three-phase literature review process,
the published literature of the subject area is organized in three main categories:
monetary-, innovation- and governance-centred points of view. After this the
material is synthesized, discussed and interpret.
2.1 Three Main Streams of the Research
After the three-stage review process, a logical approach was developed to group
the main streams of the research.
2.1.1 Monetary-Centered Approach
According to Bo¨hme et al. (2015), blockchain is of interest to economists due
to its potential to disrupt existing payment systems and perhaps even mone-
tary systems. As the cyptocurrency bitcoin is the most prominent and popular
blockchain application, and the overall cryptocurrency market has recently ex-
ceeded the valuation of 80 billion USD (Coinmarketcap.com, 2017), it is no
surprise that a majority of the blockchain literature discusses the financial and
monetary implications of blockchain. Thereby, the monetary-centered approach
is identified as one of the main streams of research. More specifically, mone-
tary economics means for example reviewing the implications of blockchain on
monetary systems, price levels and interrelations of nominal and real economy.
These implications are reviewed and discussed in chapter 4.
2.1.2 Innovation-Centered Approach
According to Davidson et al. (2016a,b) there are two approaches to the mean-
ing of technological change: the neoclassical approach and the new institutional
approach. In the neoclassical approach technological change lowers production
costs and firms are economizing on production costs, which leads to efficient allo-
cation of resources. Thereby, the innovation-centred approach to blockchain ex-
amines the efficiency improvements of production and the technological change
as a change in factor productivity. The innovation-centered approach is reviewed
and discussed in chapter 5.
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2.1.3 Governance-Centered Approach
In the new institutional approach, in turn, technological change improves the
efficient use of institutions, like markets and firms (Davidson et al., 2016b). In
this approach, blockchain is an innovation that could be used to create new ways
of governance and coordination of groups of people. Whereas in the innovation-
centered approach firms are economizing on production costs, in the governance-
centered approach firms economisze on transaction costs of exchange, leading
to efficient institutional structure of economic organization and governance. In
practice, this refers to the implementation of the institutional environment and
the functioning of for example the legal system, markets, firms and contracts.
The governance-centered approach is reviewed and discussed in chapter 6.
11
3 What is Blockchain?
Shortly after the 2008 financial crisis, Satoshi Nakamoto 2008 published a
whitepaper to introduce bitcoin: a cryptographic peer-to-peer digital money,
i.e. cryptocurrency. An open protocol that solved the double-spending prob-
lem1, which was the main obstacle in establishing a digital money, was called
the Block Chain. Henceforth, the word blockchain has been evolving. Nowadays
blockchain is associated with a certain type of open protocol which is used to
implement marketplaces without the need for a central authority (Catalini and
Gans, 2016).
At the high level, blockchain is a digital list of accounts and balances, like a
ledger. Because a copy of the ledger is broadcasted to all nodes2, a group of
actors rather than a single entity is responsible for validating the changes in the
ledger. The idea is that the shared blockchain ledger records every transaction
that has ever occurred in the network and thus maintains the complete informa-
tion of the accounts and balances of users. The complete information is used to
verify for example transactions, ownerships, transaction histories, reputations,
and so on. If there is a dispute what is the correct copy of the ledger and there
is overlapping data of the previous transactions, the agreement – which is the
correct copy of the ledger – is made without a central authority, through a dis-
tributed and incentivized consensus protocol.
The pioneer blockchain application, bitcoin, provided “the first example of how
an open protocol can be used to implement a marketplace without a need for
a central authority” Catalini and Gans (2016). The fact that a decentralized
group of people, rather than a single entity, is maintaining the ledger is the rea-
son why blockchain has also raised its popularity at the societal level (Mattila,
2016).
3.1 Definition of Blockchain
A formal, universally accepted and all-inclusive definition of blockchain does
not yet exist. Due to the lack of clear terminology, the blockchain phenomenon
can be very confusing to understand (Mattila, 2016). In this thesis, blockchain
1Double-spending refers to a situation where it is possible to spend a digital token twice if
the files can be duplicated.
2Node refers to an active device that is capable of creating, receiving, or transmitting
information over the blockchain network.
12
is defined more precisely through its three main features:
1. A digital ledger that is replicated across multiple sites.
2. The records in the ledger are time-stamped and chained together crypto-
graphically.
3. A decentralized and incentivized decision-making process, i.e. a consensus
protocol, is used to decide which copy of the ledger is correct.
All three features have a crucial role in implementing a decentralized architec-
ture. First, the replication of the ledger across multiple sites allows each node
to access the transaction history. This is a precondition for the transparent and
decentralized nature of the blockchain network. Second, chaining the ledger’s
time-stamped entries cryptographically makes it tamper-proof and provides se-
curity since new transactions need to reference to the previous ones in order
to be accepted. Third, a consensus protocol enables gaining a consensus of the
chronology and contents of the ledger without a central authority. The third
feature also distinguishes blockchain from close concepts like centrally governed
cryptographic databases.
Altogether, blockchain is a combination of several existing inventions. Broad-
casting a continuously growing ledger of transactions across a network of growing
number of connections requires an increasing capacity of processing, storing and
shipping information3. Even though the inventions are old, According to David-
son et al. (2016b), the reason why blockchain has become a viable technology
only recently lies in the exponential decrease in the cost of processing, storing
and shipping information.
3.1.1 Replication Across Multiple Sites
Blockchain consist of a tamper-proof history of all preceding transactions that
have taken place in the network. This allows for each node to scroll backwards
the transaction history and verify the correct accounts and balances. In con-
trast to a traditional centralized ledger, in blockchain a copy of the records is
broadcasted across the network.
The main outcome of the replication is that if agent “Alice” is willing to transfer
digital tokens to agent “Bob”, she has to refer to the previous transaction his-
tory that she in fact is the owner of the token she is willing to transfer. Others
3Note Metcalfe’s law: As new nodes joins a network, the number of unique connections in
a network grows exponentially.
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Figure 1: Broadcasting transactions across multiple sites
in the network can confirm this because they are able to access the transaction
history. Once the network agrees about the transaction, the updated list of
records is broadcasted again across the network (Figure 1).
3.1.2 Cryptographic Chain
Cryptographic protocols allow the transfer of sensitive information over a pub-
lic network and prevent third parties from tampering the information (Bellare
and Rogaway, 2005). The invention of digital signatures and timestamping in
the 1970s provided premises for pure peer-to-peer digital currencies. Diffie and
Hellman (1976) published a paper on a public-private key cryptosystem. This
meant that enciphering and deciphering of data required two distinct keys: a
public and a private one. Figure 2 illustrates the logic how the public-private
14
key cryptography works.
Figure 2: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (A.J. Han Vinck 2011)
In a blockchain network, a public-private key cryptography enables procedures
that make the transactions tamper-proof, traceable and secure. The illustration
in the figure 2 is a simplification but it encompasses an important feature: the
solution to a problem is hard to find by outsiders, but once found, it is easy to
check by others.
When the public transportation of information takes place, it is hard for an
outsider to guess the “secret colours”. However, as Alice and Bob decrypt the
message with their secret colours and form the “common secret”, it is easy for
others to accept the original information (colours) that later on was mixed for
the transfer.
For example, the bitcoin network works through SHA-256 cryptography. Each
transaction has a unique and completely unpredictable 32-character long cryp-
tographic hash function4, i.e. a digital signature. The digital signature includes
crucial information about the transaction, including user codes, transferable as-
4Cryptographic hash functions have an input (message) and an output (digest). In between
there is a cryptographic hash function. It is easy to compute a hash value for any given
message, but it is infeasible to generate a message from its hash value except by trying all
possible messages. Thus the solution can be found only iteratively.
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sets and timestamps. The information is encrypted behind the cryptographic
protocol and its decryption and adding to the chain of preceding transaction
requires using processing power by others in the network. Once the solution
to the cryptographic hash function is found, i.e. the crucial information is de-
crypted, confirming it by others is easy. If the latest transaction is acceptable
when referring to the preceding transaction in the network – or in other words,
Alice had indeed had the funds that she sent to Bob – the transaction is added
to the shared ledger.
3.1.3 Incentivized Consensus Protocol
Lastly, there are two crucial questions left: i) why would the rest of the blockchain
network be interested in maintaining the blockchain by decrypting the transac-
tion information (by spending some scarce resource like computing power) and
ii) what happens if two or more nodes have an overlapping copy of the ledger?
The solution is an incentivized consensus protocol. Consensus protocols are
designed to keep the system running and to add the correct information to the
ledger in a decentralized network of strangers. Thus, the network of nodes are
able to maintain the blockchain. In the other words, consensus protocol is the
way how everyone on the blockchain network can reach consensus in deciding
together what data accurately represents recent transactions across the network.
The protocols are incentivized in such a way that the nodes ought to act ac-
cording to the rules and add only correct information to the ledger. In practice,
this would mean some sort of a “carrot-stick” system where the nodes are re-
warded when they add information which a majority of the network agrees with5.
Thereby, in order to tamper the ledger, a majority of the network should coop-
erate by claiming some false information to be correct. This should be against
their own interests if the incentive to add the correct information is high enough
compared to the possible gain of tampering the ledger. The reward is typically
a valuable token, like bitcoins. This process is also used usually to supply more
digital money to the system.
The most popular consensus protocol is proof-of-work (PoW), where nodes need
to use their processing power to solve the cryptographic hash functions and thus
validate the new blocks. Another popular consensus protocol is proof-of-stake
(PoS), where the scarce resource to validate the transactions is some sort of a
valuable stake. These can be digital tokens, for example. Alternative consensus
5Recall the feature of cryptographic hash functions: hard to solve but easy to check.
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protocols are continuously developed.
Proof-of-Work
As explained earlier, cryptographic hash functions are used to create a unique
digital signature for each transaction. This digital signature is broadcasted to
the entire network and should be decrypted iteratively. By using computing
power the nodes start to compete in solving the original input that created the
digital signature. This happens by submitting randomly all possible inputs.
The process is called mining.
When the first node that finds the correct solution to the problem it broad-
casts it again to the entire network. Since the correct solution is easy to check
by others, the rest of the network can agree with a valid transaction and the
node that solved the problem first is rewarded by tokens. The reward can be
either a transaction fee or fully new tokens, when the mining process is also
used as a way to issue more money for circulation.
An important feature of mining is that it should be incentivized in a way that
makes the nodes willing to spend their computing power to solve the crypto-
graphic hash functions. This means that the reward should exceed the cost of
the used power. In principle, the nodes could also use their computing power
to find solutions to fake transactions in order to double-spend their tokens, for
example. Because of this, the system should be incentivized so that it would
require unreasonably high amount of computing power to rewrite all the pre-
vious blocks to tamper the ledger. It would therefore be more attractive to
validate the real transactions and be rewarded according to the rules. Bo¨hme
et al. (2015) state that “the probability of an entry becoming superseded goes
down as more blocks are built on top of it, eventually becoming very low.” This
is due to the fact that in order to tamper the history of transactions, e.g. to
claim owning of an untrue amount digital money, all previous blocks should be
rewritten because all transactions have to refer to preceding transactions.
Even though proof-of-work consensus protocol is viable in establishing scarcity
and prevent double-spending, it does not come without problems. The main
issues are related to its energy-intensity, costs and scalability. For example,
Becker et al. (2013) estimates that if proof-of-work was used as a mechanism to
authenticate all electronic payments in the world, it would impose an ecological
footprint similar to global commercial air traffic. O’Dwyer and Malone (2014)
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have shown that the energy consumption of bitcoin mining is comparable to the
electricity consumption of Ireland.
Croman et al. (2016) argues that the increasing popularity of blockchain-based
cryptocurrencies has made scalability a primary and urgent concern. Thereby,
the need for finding faster, more scalable and more energy-efficient consensus
algorithms is important.
Proof-of-Stake
Instead of mining with computational power, as in the proof-of-work protocol,
in the proof-of-stake (PoS) protocol the mining is done by using the tokens
which an agent owns within the system. In PoS, a miner is putting up a stake,
or is locking an amount of coins, to verify which copy of the ledger is correct.
According to Bentov et al. (2016), “the rationale behind proof-of-stake is that
entities who hold stake in the system are well-suited to maintain its security,
since their stake will diminish in value when the security of the system erodes”.
Proof-of-stake serves as a backbone for cryptocurrencies like peercoin, blackcoin
and NXT, for example.
Bentov et al. (2016) identifies at least two major issues related to pure proof-
of-stake systems. First, the initial distribution of tokens might give dispropor-
tionately huge power to first movers since they own a large proportion of the
tokens, which are used to decide which copy of the ledger is correct. Second, the
network is fragile due to a problem called “nothing-at-stake”. If there is no risk
of losing tokens in the protocol (alike spending computing power in the PoW) it
might be beneficial to vote purposefully for a wrong copy or simultaneously vote
for multiple copies, in order to double-spend tokens, for example. Thereby, the
tokens should be made scarce artificially by coding the scarcity to the algorithm
of the blockchain network and simultaneously making sure that placing a stake
to vote for the correct copy of the ledger is properly incentivized.
Alternative Protocols
Developers and researchers are working also on alternative ways to manufac-
ture distributed consensus since PoW and PoS have both their own limitations.
According to Croman et al. (2016), the possible alternatives include:
• Hybrids of proof-of-work and proof-of-stake
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• Consortium consensus, where critical protocols are executed by small sets
of trusted entities
• Sharding, where task of consensus is split among concurrently operating
sets of actors
• Proof-of-validation, implying a security deposit of voters
• Proof-of-capacity, taking advantage of free storage capacity in voting
• Proof-of-importance, where the voting power depends on peer reputation
3.2 Example: Bitcoin Blockchain
Bitcoin gives a good example of the use of the proof-of-work protocol. “Peer-
miners”, who can be anyone in the bitcoin network, maintain bitcoin by adding
new information to the ledger. Peer-miners solve cryptographic hash functions
iteratively using computing power. Participating to the mining process is volun-
tary, but when new information is added to the ledger peer-miners are favoured
with new bitcoins and therefore incentivised to maintain the ledger in a fully
decentralized way.
When new information (a block) is added to the chain of previous transactions,
other nodes of the network need to accept that the solution to the hash function
is correct, implying that the new transaction is valid. According to Nakamoto
(2008), the six main steps to run the bitcoin network are the following:
1. Transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
2. Each node collects new transactions into a block.
3. Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block (decrypts
the hash function).
4. When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.
5. Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not
already spent.
6. Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the
next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the pre-
vious hash.
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Once the new transactions are accepted, the ledger cannot be changed without
redoing all of the work required to find the proof-of-work solution at the first
place. For example, if a node is claiming to own assets that it actually does not
own, it should redo all the work done to create a transaction history in which
the balances would show that the dishonest node has the assets. In addition, the
node needs to get the acceptance of other nodes for changing the transaction
history. In practice, this means that the system is secure as long as honest
miners collectively control more of the network’s computing power than any
cooperating group of attackers. As the number of nodes in the network grows,
the possibility of cooperating attackers is likely to become lower.
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4 Monetary-Centered Approach
In this chapter, blockchain is reviewed from the monetary point of view, first by
reviewing how digital money and cryptocurrencies could potentially serve as a
store of value, a medium of exchange and an unit of value. Second, the features
of cryptocurrencies are studied through the quantity theory of money. Third,
the possible implications and opportunities of digital money on monetary policy
are discussed.
4.1 Properties of Blockchain Cryptocurrencies
Money facilitates exchange by allocating resources efficiently and measuring
value of various goods and services. Usually money we refers to central bank
issued fiat currencies. However, this is not self-evident. Whereas historically
currencies were chosen from among existing commodities, modern technology
(including blockchain) gives unprecedented flexibility in designing the attributes
of currencies (Gans and Halaburda, 2015a).
4.1.1 Currency Definitions
Fiat currency: ”Any legal tender designated and issued by a central authority
that people are willing to accept in exchange for goods and services because it
is backed by regulation, and because they trust this central authority.”(ECB,
2012)
Digital money: ”A digital representation of value that is neither issued by
a central bank or a public authority, nor necessarily attached to a fiat currency,
but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of payment and can be
transferred, stored or traded electronically.” (ECB, 2012)
Cryptocurrency: A decentralized digital currency, which does not need finan-
cial intermediaries in order to perform electronic transactions. It has neither a
central bank nor other authority in control of its monetary policy. (Peters et al.,
2015)
Thus, two types of digital currencies exist: cryptocurrencies and non-cryptocurrencies
(Dandapani and Dandapani, 2017). Cryptocurrencies are decentralized peer-to-
peer digital currencies based on computer cryptography (e.g. blockchain). Pop-
ular cryptocurrencies include bitcoin, litecoin, zerocoin and peercoin. In turn,
examples of digital non-cryptocurrencies include Facebook credits, Microsoft
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points and Amazon coin, which are backed by the named corporations and are
thus not decentralized by definition.
4.1.2 Functions of Money
Any kind of money must fulfill three basic functions: unit of account, medium
of exchange and store of value (Jevons, 1885). Unit of account means that the
value of goods can be assessed in terms of a uniform intermediary. Medium of
exchange means that money is an intermediary used for transactions, and thus
economic agents do not need to engage in barter exchange. Money must also
be able to transfer purchasing power to some future date and therefore serve as
a store of value.
According to Bo¨hme et al. (2015), Peters et al. (2015), Ali et al. (2014) and
Bank bankofcanada.ca (2014), bitcoin fulfils these three basic functions to some
extent, but not in the way that fiat currencies do. Next, the three functions of
money are discussed in the context of cryptocurrencies.
Cryptocurrencies as a Store of Value
The parties of a transaction should always consider - at least temporarily - an
asset as a store of value in order to fulfil, even theoretically, the other two basic
functions. Thus, an asset should have an expectation of positive value also in
a future date, which basically is a result of sufficient demand and supply of
the asset. Next, the possible sources of demand and procedures of supply of
cryptocurrencies are reviewed.
Demand
According to Dwyer (2015), foreign currency exchanges are probably the most
obvious way in which the use of cryptocurrencies can become widespread. Dwyer
(2015) observes that if a person holds accounts in various currencies, it is cheaper
to transfer funds from one account to another through a cryptocurrency com-
pared to the current cost of obtaining foreign currencies via exchange. Also for
this reason using cryptocurrencies for international remittances are a possible
source of demand (Bo¨hme et al., 2015).
Another important feature of cryptocurrencies is their perceived anonymity.
According to Catalini and Gans (2016), illegal marketplaces were one of the
early ones to use bitcoin and thus bootstrapped its value. Many publications,
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including Athey et al. (2016), Raskin and Yermack (2016) and Peters et al.
(2015) have documented this source of demand.
The good portability properties of digital money in general (not only cryptocur-
rencies) implies lower transaction costs in transferring big amounts of value.
Correspondingly, the ease to divide and recombine digital money make practi-
cally any denomination possible. This also provides a technical infrastructure
for different applications like micropayments. (Peters and Panayi, 2016)
Cryptocurrencies are also an attractive store of value in countries with high fi-
nancial instability. They may provide security especially in countries with high
national debt (Gans and Halaburda, 2015a), and protection against the risk
of inflation. For example, Moreno (2016) finds that in Argentina the demand
for the cryptocurrency bitcoin has increased during periods of high inflation.
Cryptocurrencies are also an appealing alternative in countries facing currency
devaluation or where trust in the government is low (Catalini and Gans, 2016).
In addition, events such as India’s demonetization of the 500 and 1000 rupee
notes can increase consumers’ interest in cryptocurrencies (Catalini and Gans,
2016).
To summarize, foreign exchanges, international remittances, online market-
places, financial crises and other instabilities are the identified reasons why of
cryptocurrencies and alternative payment mechanisms may increase their pop-
ularity.
Supply
In order to have a positive value, the supply of money should be scarce. In the
case of cryptocurrencies, scarcity is usually pre-determined and coded in the
algorithm. For example, bitcoin’s nominal quantity of money is an increasing
concave geometric series (figure 3) until the total number of coins in circulation
reaches the upper limit of about 21 million in 2041 (Nakamoto, 2008). In turn,
cryptocurrency litecoin has ex-ante determined its annual supply up to 84 mil-
lion coins (four times more than bitcoin) by 2140 (Litecoin.org, 2017).
In fact, money supply is likely to turn even negative in the end of the min-
ing period. Bitcoins are constantly irreversibly destroyed as users forget their
private keys or coins are sent to accounts that are not in use anymore. In ad-
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dition, if an owner dies and their private key is not accessible, their tokens are
taken out of circulation.
Figure 3: Bitcoin Supply over Time
Besides scarcity, there are other issues related to the supply of cryptocurrencies:
How are decentralized cryptocurrencies created? If there is revenue from creat-
ing the currency, who receives it? What issues determine changes in the nominal
quantity of money? (Dwyer, 2015)Both networks, bitcoin and litecoin, exploit
the idea of mining, where money supply is channelled through peer-miners who
are rewarded for using computing power to validate transactions and thus keep-
ing the network running.
Digital currencies give unprecedented flexibility to design different attributes
to currencies (Bo¨hme et al., 2015). Cryptocurrencies are usually based on an
open source software, this creates an opportunity for anyone to access the orig-
inal blockchain code to learn, copy and design their own money (Kane 2017).
This creates an exceptional potential for experimentation of different properties
of money (Gans and Halaburda, 2015b).
Cryptocurrenices as a Medium of Exchange
If assumed that a cryptocurrency fulfills the fundamental preconditions of posi-
tive value, i.e. sufficient demand and supply, what would then be the qualities of
a good medium of exchange? According to Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) a critical
factor is whether economic agents believe that a cryptocurrency can serve as a
medium of exchange. This refers to the scope of the acceptance of the currency.
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Therefore, at least the regulatory environment and the recognition of major
marketplaces are important factors in making the currency a good medium of
exchange.
The website Spendbitcoins.com (2017) listed over 100 000 large and small mer-
chants who accept bitcoins. Some significant brands like Amazon, the travel
agency Expedia and the fashion store Asos were included in the list. Still, the
universal acceptability of bitcoin has been slow and the currency has suffered
on volatility issues (Dandapani and Dandapani, 2017). The regulatory environ-
ment has an important role in the acceptance of bitcoin. The legal treatment
of bitcoin varies widely across countries, ranging from Denmark, where cryp-
tocurrencies are not regulated at all, to Thailand where using bitcoins has been
criminalized (loc.gov, 2014).
According to Holdsworth (1914), in addition to acceptance other qualities of
a good medium of exchange include divisibility, portability and existence in suf-
ficiently large quantities. As explained earlier, divisibility and portability are
advantages of digital money relative to fiat money (Barber et al., 2012; Peters
and Panayi, 2016). The sufficiently large existence means in this case the supply
of the digital money, which depends on the chosen design principles. The tech-
nology gives flexibility in designing and experimenting different attributes. How-
ever, cryptocurrencies, which are based on the proof-of-work consensus mecha-
nism like bitcoin, might face obstacles related to scalability when the money in
the circulation increases. According to Bo¨hme et al. (2015), if bitcoin expanded
to include a huge volume of transactions, the storage burden would need to be
addressed. Furthermore, updating the proof-of-work blockchain entails undesir-
able delays, making bitcoin too slow for many in-person retail payments. This
would also consume high amounts of energy. Thereby, whereas cryptocurren-
cies based on proof-of-work create scarcity and security, they also have some
undesirable technical properties limiting their scale and ability to serve as large
scale media of exchange.
4.2 Cryptocurrencies and Quantity Theory of Money
The quantity theory of money builds a link between the nominal money sup-
ply, price level and size of the real economy (Friedman, 1968). Traditionally,
monetary policy aims to slowly increasing prices with stable growth of econ-
omy.According to the theory, in a closed economy price level (P) times real
value of transactions (T) equals money output (M) times money velocity (V).
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P ∗ T = M ∗ V (1)
In the context of cryptocurrencies, the real transaction value (T) is equivalent
to the extent of economic activity using the underlying cryptocurrency. Velocity
(V) refers to how fast money passes from one holder to the next. Money supply
(M) on the underlying issuance model which differs from one cryptocurrency to
another as explained earlier. In order to study the price level as a dependent
variable, from equation (1) can be derived:
P =
M ∗ V
T
(2)
Increase in money supply (M) or velocity (V) imply higher prices if other fac-
tors are held constant. Higher real transaction volume (T) would in turn cause
downward pressure on prices. Following this, an interpretation can be made
that given a constant velocity (V) and an increase in real transaction volume
(T), in the case of the money supply (M) turning negative, a downward pres-
sure on prices follows. Bo¨hme et al. (2015) points out thereby a question “what
happens when the size of an economy grows at a different rate than the quantity
of money in that economy?” A declining price level is usually associated with
money hoarding and the postponement of spending, which can lead to a vicious
deflationary circle.
However, a fair assumption is that in the near future, prices will be denomi-
nated in national fiat currencies. Thus, the role of cryptocurrencies would be
to serve as a store of value and as an alternative payment method for some
transactions. Thereby, the deflationary features of a cryptocurrency would not
mean a decline in the prices at the economy level but rather a possible increase
in the value of the underlying cryptocurrency.
If there was downward pressure on prices (equation 2) due to the declining
money supply (M) and increase in real transaction volumes (T), there would
also be pressure for the higher value of the cryptocurrency in question. A lower
price level (P) would mean lower cryptocurrency-denominated prices, but the
exchange value of the cryptocurrency would actually be higher if a fiat currency
is still the primary unit of account. In this case, the underlying cryptocurrency
would have higher purchasing power in a future date and the pressure of increase
in its value would make the cryptocurrency more attractive as a store of value.
The conclusion is that if the supply is fixed and decreasing, or even negative,
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there should be some sources of demand for cryptocurrencies in order to store
healthy value as a medium of exchange. Otherwise the value would be purely
speculative. As identified in the previous section, the possible sources of demand
include foreign currency exchanges, international remittances, anonymous mar-
ketplaces, and marketplaces where the portability of value and divisibility are
important.
4.3 Blockchain and Monetary Policy
The general understanding is that monetary policy would be hard to imple-
ment without an increasing money supply. If this is true, it is not likely that
cryptocurrencies with fixed or declining money supply would gain ground as a
mainstream medium of exchange or a unit of account. However, they might still
become a mainstream store of value (Bo¨hme et al., 2015).
Central banks could still apply the blockchain technologies to develop their
monetary policies. For example, blockchain technologies could enable central
banks to directly provide citizens with digital, central bank money (Catalini and
Gans, 2016). This is an interesting feature to implement different basic income
models, for example, or to providing quantitative easing directly to citizens. In
addition, blockchain can provide a technical infrastructure to manage money
supply and interest rates more effectively. (Catalini and Gans, 2016)
Roberds (2016) argues that the emergence of digital currencies is analogous to
the emergence of banknotes in England in the 17th century. First, the demand
for cash is declining, but second, cash is also an enormous source of revenue
for central banks and government beneficiaries and a robust channel for central
bank financing. Roberds (2016) predicts that for these reasons at some point
in the not-too-distant future the “business model” of central banks and the ar-
chitecture of money may need remodelling. He also argues that “we should not
be surprised to see new payment technologies dominated by a very few players,
of a size sufficient (e.g. Google) to internalize the relevant network effects.”
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5 Innovation-Centered Approach
Blockchain is an ICT innovation, which enhances the productivity of several
processes but also creates new marketplaces through the reduction of trans-
action costs. This is primarily a consequence of the decline in 1) the cost of
verification, and 2) the cost of networking (Catalini and Gans, 2016). However,
the mainstream adoption of blockchain, which would unlock the benefits of in-
teroperability and the network effects6 of the technology, requires significant
diffusion process. In order for this to happen, there should be actors who are
interested to invest in the technology.
Technological change can be either exogenous, where the change is external
to the economic system, or endogenous, which is driven by intentional invest-
ments by profit-maximizing agents (Romer, 1990). Endogenous change requires
naturally the expectation of positive returns to investments. This means that
the technology should generate savings through efficiency, or it should bring
new sources of revenue from new marketplaces.
The process is complex from a single entrepreneurial viewpoint. Like the case is
with all new technologies, blockchain entrepreneurs must take risks and gather
distributed non-price information as inputs into their economic calculations over
potential profitable opportunities, which often involve a lengthy period of trial-
and-error experimentation (Allen, 2016). It is important to note that the inabil-
ity of a single firm to appropriate all the benefits generated by the technology
may result in underinvestment (Catalini and Gans, 2016).
In this chapter, the two approaches to technological change, exogenous and en-
dogenous, are reviewed and the possible sources of productivity increases gained
from blockchain are discussed. After that, blockchain is compared to the defini-
tion of the general-purpose technologies, which are pervasive technologies that
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) argue to be the ultimate sources of long-run
economic growth.
5.1 Two Approaches to Technological Change
The Cobb-Douglas production function states that the aggregate economy pro-
duces change in output (Y) as a function of change in productivity (A), change
6When a network effect is present, the value of a product or service increase as a function
of the number of others using it (Metcalfe’s law)
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in capital (K), and change in labour (L).
Y = AKβLα
In the advanced economies, the increase in productivity is considered generally
as the most important driver of long-term growth. Economists widely agree
that technological change is the single most important driver of productivity
growth. However, models differ whether technological change is a consequence
of endogenous or exogenous factors to the economy. The Solow-Swan growth
model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) assumes that long-run growth is achievable
only through exogenous technological change, which is unexplained within the
model. In turn, the modern growth theory (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988) explains
long-term growth through endogenous forces like investment in innovation and
education, which also leads to technological change and more efficient labor and
capital.
5.1.1 Blockchain and Technological Change
In the endogenous technological change, the productivity increase is a result of
purposeful investment to the research and development. As the maximization
of profits is a powerful driver of technological change (Huesemann and Huese-
mann, 2011), if the expected profits are positive, the investments occur that
drive the technological change.
According to Catalini and Gans (2016), usually a single firm that invests in
a new technology is unable to appropriate all its benefits. This in turn can
cause underinvestment in the technology and suboptimal outcome and public
support is needed to correct the market failure. The technology “will only be
developed if a firm is able to appropriate its benefits through complementary
assets, or if a public effort supports its early development as in the case of the
internet” (Catalini and Gans, 2016). Without any external influences, techno-
logical change is a social process which can be strongly biased by a short-term
financial interest (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2011). Thereby, the diffusion of
any new technology is likely a result of both, exogenous and endogenous factors.
In 2016, the value of investments in blockchain initiatives exceeded 1 billion
USD (Johnson, 2016). However, according to Zhao et al. (2016), “business re-
search in blockchain is found mainly in the conceptual level that conceptualizes
blockchain innovations in business and in the prescriptive level that outlines
business applications of blockchain”. The real business potential and thereby
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the premises for the endogenous technological change of blockchain are not yet
especially clear.
Also consultants, such as Gartner (2016), expect that overinvestment to the
blockchain technology has occurred and blockchain is going to face a “peak of
inflated expectations” (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Gartner Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2016
The prescriptive sources of blockchain-enabled business models can be di-
vided into two categories: cost savings through efficiency improvements and
increased revenue through new marketplaces. Next, these two categories are
reviewed.
5.1.2 Blockchain-Enabled Efficiency Improvements
In general, an innovation that enhances productivity enables more to be done
with less. Yet how is this gain possible in the context of blockchain? According
to Davidson et al. (2016b), it is not that the electrons now move faster, or that
the processing engines are more efficient (metaphorically). Instead, the source
of the productivity gain can often be traced to an organizational efficiency gain.
Blockchain decrease production costs by changing the organizational form by
which value is created, often stripping out layers of activity that are no longer
needed.
Different processes of transactions, in for example online commerce and in-
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vesting, require verification of ownerships, checks and balances. According to
Catalini and Gans (2016), blockchain decreases the cost of verification and thus
improves the efficiency of these transactions. Also Davidson et al. (2016b) claim
that decentralized solutions to ledgers can become increasingly cost efficient
compared to centralized solutions, leading to the described efficiency gain.
According to Zhao et al. (2016), financial sector is the leader in blockchain-
related business innovations (Zhao et al., 2016). Peters and Panayi (2016) sug-
gest that blockchain may enable efficiency improvements in the banking sector
at least in:
• Back-end bookkeeping systems, i.e. banking ledgers;
• Transaction processing systems;
• Trading and sales functions;
• Interbank money transfer systems;
• Settlements of financial assets.
Other possible blockchain-enabled efficiency improvements are related to for
example supply chain management (Pilkington, 2015), stock exchange (listing,
trading, voting, ownership transfers and more accurate records) (Yermack, 2017)
and corporate governance (providing data efficiently for investors, auditors and
other stakeholder groups) (Kim and Laskowski 2016, Yermack 2017).
Even though some sources of efficiency improvements can be identified, Zhao
et al. (2016) and Peters and Panayi (2016) point out that they are unaware of
research that would explain in detail exactly how and in what form blockchain
technology could provide these benefits. Thereby, the exact source and dy-
namics of these cost savings remains unclear and, as Zhao et al. (2016) put it,
“research in the descriptive level is lagging”.
5.1.3 Blockchain-Enabled New Marketplaces
Another source of possible entrepreneurial profits and thus endogenous techno-
logical change is the emergence of new marketplaces. This means that profits
rise when technology facilitates the exchange of items and services whose ex-
change was not previously efficient or relevant.
According to Catalini and Gans (2016), blockchain allows market participants to
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perform costless verification, and thereby it lowers the costs of auditing transac-
tion information. Thus it makes it efficient to make transactions in the market-
places where it would previously have been inefficient due to low the transaction
value compared to the transaction costs. An example of this are different shar-
ing economy platforms that require a verification of trust and mechanisms to
monitor reputation and payment systems. If on top of that the transaction
values are low, creating a profitable business model is challenging to create.
New markets can emerge in the banking sector as well. The development of
a more interoperable financial platform through blockchain could substantially
lower the entry costs for new players in these heavily regulated markets (Catal-
ini and Gans, 2016). This could provoke investments in startups that try to
challenge existing business models.
Another concrete examples of a new marketplace is the emergence of digital
currencies. For example, bitcoin has not created just a new representation of
value but also completely new industries, including bitcoin mining companies,
wallets and exchanges, which have attracted investments and driven the tech-
nological change.
An interesting feature of especially cryptocurrencies is that cryptocurrency pro-
tocols can incentivize the emergence of networks of exchange through native
cryptocurrency tokens (Catalini and Gans, 2016). According to Catalini and
Gans (2016), “relative to open source projects, which have to rely on donations
of time and resources, . . . cryptocurrency protocols can offer direct, monetary
incentives to fund their growth.” In the end of chapter 6 is an example how a
decentralized cooperation can be incentivized to grow.
5.2 Blockchain as a New General-Purpose Technology
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) have suggested that “general-purpose tech-
nologies” (GPTs) are the ultimate sources of productivity increase, and thus
also of the long-run economic growth. Most of GPTs play the role of “enabling
technologies”, opening new opportunities rather than final solutions (Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg, 1995). Traditional examples of GPTs are the steam engine,
the electric motor, semiconductors and the internet.
By definition, GPTs are technologies that are pervasive (spreading to many sec-
tors), have inherent potential for technical improvements (improving over time)
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and innovational complementarities (spawning new innovations). With these
qualities, GPTs generate economic activity and eventually generalized produc-
tivity gains. They are pervasive technologies that shape societies and cultures
and lead to monumental changes in economic organizations. (Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1995).
For example, according to Catalini and Gans (2016) and Allen (2016), blockchain
has the potential to become a new general-purpose technology. Next, the three
features of GPTs, and the potential of blockchain to become one in the future,
are analyzed.
5.2.1 Pervasiveness of Blockchain
Blockchain is used across different sectors. The pervasiveness reaches anywhere
where a protocol for sending, receiving, confirming and recording value or infor-
mation is plausible and clear identification by one or more actors in the network
is possible (Pilkington, 2015; Crosby et al., 2016). According to for example
Kane (2017) and Allen (2016), the blockchain technology is applicable to a wide
variety of sectors and has the potential to expand rapidly and is thereby a per-
vasive technology.
Examples of applications sectors of blockchain vary from digital identity providers
(e.g. OneName and BitID) and anything where the ownership and transaction
history of assets is important (ownership rights, real estate, automobiles, phys-
ical assets) to insurances and voting-systems (e.g. Bitnation and Bitcongress).
Swan (2015) argues that many new and different kinds of governance models
and services might be possible using blockchain technology. According to Swan
(2015), blockchain could become both ”the mechanism for governing in the
present, and the repository of all of a society’s documents, records, and history
for use in the future - a society’s universal record-keeping system.”
5.2.2 Potential for Technical Improvements of Blockchain
GPTs are technologies that are capable for further improvement and change
(Carlaw and Lipsey, 2006). Blockchain’s form as an open source software gives
it great potential for technical improvements over time. According to Kane
(2017), the power of open source software lies in the opportunity for anyone to
access the original blockchain code to learn, copy and create their own appli-
cations. For example, from the launch of bitcoin, people have taken its open
source code and developed their own unique applications. According to the
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survey by Kane (2017) with over 200 blockchain companies, “in the relatively
short time that blockchain technology has existed it has changed innumerable
times as people experiment and tinker with it trying to find new and more useful
applications.”
As noted in chapter 3, different consensus protocols for blockchain are continu-
ously developed (Croman et al., 2016). In addition, the supporting innovations
in processing, storing and shipping of information are creating room for more
efficient blockchain technology.
5.2.3 Innovational Complementarities of Blockchain
According to Allen (2016), blockchain is complementary with existing technolo-
gies, institutions and organisations (e.g. banks), including ‘economies’ such as
the physical parts of the sharing economy and the internet of things (IoT).
The blockchain application platform Ethereum states that the potential value of
blockchain lies in its interoperability and the exponential value that comes from
creating networks (Buterin, 2014). Improvement in one area makes subsequent
improvements in other areas increasingly beneficial. Allen (2016) explains that
blockchain “creates new ways to create” and Kane (2017) argues that blockchain
provokes further innovations through for example more efficient crowdfunding
and crowdsourcing technologies.
5.2.4 Is Blockchain a New GPT?
Altogether, technological change and the emergence and mass-adoption of a new
GPTs is likely a combination of external and endogenous forces. Like explained
earlier, blockchain has already shown its pervasiveness in different sectors and
applicability in different functions. It is also complementary with for example
banking, IoT and the sharing economy (Allen, 2016). Blockchain itself has
room for technical improvements. This is powered by open source software
development, progress in more efficient consensus mechanisms and potential
continuation of increase in the processing capacity. These features makes it a
potential GPT in the future.
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6 Governance-Centered Approach
The governance-centered approach to the economics of blockchain studies whether
blockchain could be an institutional technology for coordinating the economic
actions of people and organisations. Herein governance is defined as “proofs of
interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective prob-
lem” (Hufty, 2011).
Markets and firms are alternative institutions for economic governance (Williamson,
1975). The basic insight of new institutional economics is that the transactions
that occur in markets create room for opportunism. Firms and intermediat-
ing centralised actors like banks, have emerged to mitigate this opportunism
(Williamson, 1975, 1985; Coase, 1937).
In this chapter the basics of new institutional economics are reviewed, followed
by an analysis and examples on how blockchain can actually facilitate more de-
centralised interactions and decisions. Finally, the potential of blockchain to in-
centivize decentralized production is explained through an example of Backfeed,
which is described as “a social operating system for decentralized cooperation”.
6.1 New Institutional Economics
The governance-centered approach can be analyzed through the new institu-
tional economics. New institutional economics studies markets and firms as
alternative institutions of economic governance, i.e. institutions that organise
transactions. This discipline is interested in why some transactions occur in
markets and some in hierarchies (firms).
Whereas the neoclassical analysis of economics focuses on production costs
achieved through efficiency improvements, the new institutional economic anal-
ysis (also known as transaction cost economics) emphasizes the notion of trans-
action costs and the efficient use of organizations and markets. Transaction costs
in markets stem from information costs, bargaining costs and enforcement costs
of contracts (Coase, 1937). According to Dahlman (1979), information costs
are such a costs that occur for example when economic agents spend resources
to determine whether the required product is available on markets or they are
looking for the best available price. Bargaining costs arise from drawing up
an appropriate contract for a transaction and enforcement costs are “the costs
of making sure the other party sticks to the terms of the contract” (Dahlman,
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1979).
Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that opportunism arises in market exchange for
several reasons. Williamson (1993) argues that trust between economic agents
is ”calculative”. Calculative trust “raises via sober assessment of the costs and
benefits to the other party of exploiting another’s vulnerability” and presumes
that without correct economic incentives, pure trust cannot facilitate transac-
tions (Williamson, 1993).
According to Williamson (1985), the existence of organizational form is largely
shaped by the need to control opportunism. Markets are often efficient gov-
ernance institutions for spot contracts (immediate payment and delivery), but
where the economic activity requires asset specificity (coordinated investment
through time), frequency (ongoing relation between parties) or uncertainty (un-
contractible dealings), alternative governance institutions are needed to deal
with the hazard of opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Whereas opportunism oc-
curs in transactions made in markets, hiring people would “bound [them] by
some common purpose to achieve objectives” (Coase, 1937). Another form to
mitigate opportunism is to introduce a trusted third party, like a bank or a
real estate agent, who would facilitate the trust between the two agents of the
transaction (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985).
6.1.1 Trust, Opportunism and Blockchain
According to Williamson (1993), three forms of trust exist: personal, calculative
and institutional. According to Williamson (1985), personal trust cannot be a
safeguard of business relationships. The institutional form of trust refers in turn
to the social and organizational context within which contracts are embedded
(North, 1990).
In the simple trust game example (figure 5), consider that P2 would like to
pursue some income as a taxi driver but does not own a car. However, P2 can
rent a car from P1 by agreeing to pay a partial return of the income from the
pursued profits as a rent. If the payment is paid as agreed, both get a payoff r.
Assume that P1 and P2 have only calculative trust on each other and the trans-
action take place in a market without a trust-facilitating intermediary. Now, if
P1 decides to trust P2 and rents out the car, P2 has an incentive to defect (e.g.
lie about the generated income) if the payoff is 1 > r. If P1 is aware of this,
she does not trust P2 at the first place and the potentially mutually beneficial
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Figure 5: Simple Trust Game (Source: McNamara et al. 2009)
set of transactions does not take place at all. Thereby, due to the information
asymmetry, both get an outcome s < r.
One solution to the dilemma presented above is to establish a taxi firm where a
capital owner P1 hires P2, and thus bounds the incentives of the two parties to
common objectives. This kind of organization could formalize sanction systems
and monitor individual actions in this “internal market”.
Another solution to the dilemma is to establish a neutral third party institution
that punishes P2 for the defect to the extent that the payoff r for cooperation
is higher than for the defect that would be 1 - p (p = punishment) (Figure 6).
In the digital economy, the centralized third-party authority could be a plat-
form provider for drivers and cars. The platform could, in the case of betrayal,
prevent P2’s access to the platform in the future, creating an incentive for P2
to cooperate. The punishing authority, or “enforcement agency”, can also be a
society at large or the risk of social ostracism (Dasgupta, 2000). For example,
banks exist as third party intermediating organizations because there are sub-
stantial costs – physical costs, information costs, and coordination costs – that
occur when the market is used for matching the supply and demand of financial
assets (Dow and Earl, 1982). Moreover, banks are maintaining a centralized
ledger of transactions and other records, and their business model consists of
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Figure 6: Simple Trust Game 2
economizing at the margin of transaction costs. Banks have created and employ
a reputational incentive mechanism that enables them to enforce contracts at a
lower cost than what distributed agents (i.e. public without a bank) could. This
is due to the ability of banks to exclude defaulting borrowers from subsequent
access to finance (MacDonald et al., 2016).
The utopian views of blockchain argue that blockchain could serve in the future
such as an intermediary, or enforcement agency, and therefore it will disrupt
every market by eliminating the need for intermediation by facilitating trust.
More realistically, Catalini and Gans (2016) argue that blockchain is “more
likely to change the scope of intermediation” through reduction of transaction
costs and by allowing the formulation of new types of marketplaces.
6.2 From Hierarchies and Intermediaries to Markets
Via the bitcoin network, blockchain has proved to be able to disseminate trust
over a network of unknown agents and thereby let people who have no particular
confidence in each other to collaborate without having to go through a neutral
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central authority. But how does blockchain facilitate trust and eliminate op-
portunism? According to Swanson (2014), this is made possible with public
transparency of previous actions (constituting to the reputation of the actors)
coupled with the consensus protocol, and smart contracts that are executed
automatically.
6.2.1 Public Reputation and Consensus Protocol
If P1 and P2 play this (figure 5 and figure 6) one stage game infinitely, and the
future is important enough, an equilibrium exists where P2 has an incentive to
cooperate and P1 to trust P2. Thereby, reputation becomes an important in-
centive mechanism that facilitates trust in anonymous online markets (Tadelis,
2016).
If the reputation follows an actor, the game would keep going infinitely from the
viewpoint of P2. In the taxi driver example, in the case of indefinite game, if P2
is interested in pursuing an income as a taxi driver, he can expose his aggregated
reputation accumulated from several other platforms to P1. Thereby, P1 would
more likely trust P2 and rent a car with good conditions. Moreover, if both
actors know that their counterparts’ reputation follows them to other platforms
automatically, they also know that continuous cooperation implies higher sum
of future payoffs for both.
(r1 + ...+ rn) > 1
Since a principle of calculative trust is that trust is based on a “sober assessment
of the costs and benefits to cooperate or exploit trust” (Williamson, 1985), as
learned earlier, P1 can assume that P2 has an incentive to cooperate. Thus, a
cooperative equilibrium exists and mutually beneficial interaction is likely to be
initiated.
Meta-Reputation and Blockchain
Public reputation systems already provide premises for numerous online peer-
to-peer marketplaces, like Amazon, eBay, Uber and Airbnb. However, the firms
govern these reputations systems centrally. In addition, the reputation in one
platform does not follow an actor to other online platforms.
If some sort of meta-reputation system, which leverages the reputation from
one platform to another, would be governed by a centralized intermediary, ver-
ifiability and privacy could become a problem (Tadelis, 2016). According to
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Tadelis (2016), blockchain may provide solutions, which would make the online
platforms work more decentralized and efficiently.
Bitcoin has demonstrated in the financial context that blockchain, i.e. auditable
computing is possible using a decentralized network of peers accompanied by a
public ledger (Zyskind et al., 2015). According to Tadelis (2016), analogously,
the blockchain technology can be used in creating a secure and robust decen-
tralized reputation system. In this case, the gatekeeper of the data are people
themselves. According to Catalini and Gans (2016), blockchain could improve
the data protection and create an economy, where people would be able to li-
cense out subsets of personal information and to revoke access when necessary
and not be reused in the future outside of the original transaction.
Similarly, as banks employ reputational incentive mechanisms by being able
to exclude defaulting borrowers from subsequent access to finance, the same
result could be achieved through decentralized reputation systems. In this case,
other peers in the network can exclude the defaulting borrower from subsequent
peer-to-peer loans. The advantage of the blockchain technology is that the
public-private cryptography enables simultaneous reliable verification of trans-
actions but also a sufficient degree of privacy. In practice, an agent with a
good payment history can leverage the reputation and get access to a platform
with good conditions. However, any single centralized intermediary would not
be able to gather, own and possibly exploit the personal information for other
purposes without consent of the customer.
This implies that the technology enables establishing and maintaining markets
for reputation, where customers retain greater control over their data and firms
can dynamically bid for access. In addition, meta-reputation can be used to
address information asymmetries and other market failures as well as monitor
market participants at a substantially lower cost. (Catalini and Gans, 2016)
6.2.2 Automatic Execution with Smart Contracts
Blockchain-based smart contracts are contracts that are executed automatically
and are supervised by the consensus of the decentralized blockchain network.
Smart contracts facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of
a contract (Allen, 2016; Davidson et al., 2016a). According to Davidson et al.
(2016b), blockchain-enabled smart contracts can increase economic efficiency
problems by decreasing the information asymmetries like adverse selection and
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moral hazard. In addition, they argue that smart contracts could be effective
ways to load significant numbers of low probability state-contingencies into con-
tracts, like open source libraries.
In third taxi driver scenario (figure 7), the payments from P2 to P1 are self-
executed through a smart contract, which is enabled by a digital payment infras-
tructure and blockchain technology. If P2 fails to execute the agreed payment to
the car owner, the control right of the car could automatically be transferred to
P1 if the car is in the network. P1 could for example shut the car automatically
down, if she is willing to do so. Thereby, P2’s pay-off from defect would be s
(s < 1), if the driving would end immediately after failing the first payment.
If the reputation would follow to other platforms as well, this makes the defect
Figure 7: Simple Trust Game 3
drastically less attractive for P2 compared to the one-time single transaction.
If P1 knows this, the mutually beneficial interaction is likely initiated.
Altogether, the combination of self-executing smart contracts with open rep-
utation systems and the blockchain consensus protocols would be a powerful
combination to facilitate trust among previously unknown agents. The taxi-
driver example can be applied to any transaction, where recording value or
information is plausible and clear identification by one or more actors in the
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network is possible (Pilkington, 2015; Crosby et al., 2016).
6.3 Decline of Transaction Costs
Blockchain can mitigate opportunism, decrease transaction costs and the cost
of verification (Catalini and Gans, 2016; Davidson et al., 2016a). Moreover, ac-
cording Davidson et al. (2016b), the transaction costs can potentially decrease
through smart contract architecture, which would decrease the costs of writing
and enforcing contracts.
The basic insight that new institutional economics can bring to the economics of
blockchain is that blockchain can facilitate a shift from firms towards markets,
as well as decrease need for trusted intermediaries (Davidson et al., 2016a,b).
According to Evans (2014), blockchain can be instrumental in “reinventing and
rebuilding modern economies and societies something closer to a peer-to-peer
platform”. This means enabling the basic necessary order of production, ex-
change and coordination to take place with smaller contributions from large
central controlled organizations (Davidson et al., 2016a,b).
According to Davidson et al. (2016b), if the model of Williamson (1975) of
firms and markets is correct and effective cooperative economic activity and
investments are stymied by opportunism, blockchain will be a revolutionary in-
stitutional innovation. In this case, more transactions can take place without
intermediaries (Davidson et al., 2016a). Moreover, according to Catalini and
Gans (2016), if assets are fully digital and ownership over them is not exclusive
to a trusted intermediaries, new business models can emerge since new entrants
can compete for the same market at a lower cost.
This would imply a shift towards a more decentralized economy (Evans, 2014).
However, it is unlikely that intermediaries would altogether disappear from
transactions but the way they are adding value might change (Catalini and
Gans, 2016).
6.4 Blockchain and Decentralized Cooperation
Shareable goods, services and actions have high use value but low exchange
value, which poses challenges to the market price system (Pazaitis et al., 2017).
The dilemma becomes more significant in the knowledge economy: data is not
scarce in the same way that physical resources and it actually thrives rather
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than depletes when it is used. Thereby, the logic of the data economy is dif-
ferent compared to industrial economy. For example, the monetary reward for
writing a Wikipedia contribution is zero but the use value likely positive.
According to Pazaitis et al. (2017), the blockchain technology is enabling a new
system of value, bringing economies closer to commons-oriented ecosystems. In
this approach, the technology would enable new means to measure and transfer
value more easily through a decentralized network.
6.4.1 Example: Backfeed and Decentralized Cooperation
Davidson et al. (2016a,b) and Pazaitis et al. (2017) are using Backfeed, a social
operating systems for decentralized cooperation, as an example how blockchain
enabled distributed value creation could work.
In the Backfeed model, contributors are rewarded with both liquid digital to-
kens and reputation representing the value of contributions. The digital tokens
also represent the equity share of the organisation and can be transferred or ex-
changed to any other token of value. The reputation, however, cannot be trans-
ferred. Thereby, the tokens represent a liquid unit of value, in parallel with the
non-transferrable reputation that represents meritocratic decision-power in the
community. Blockchain enables the procedure to be fully decentralized with-
out a central authority overlooking or deciding the value of the contributions.
This is especially relevant for the sharing economy, which mostly relies on a
centralised crowd-sourcing model, where people contribute to a platform but do
not actually benefit from its success. (Pazaitis et al., 2017)
Next, an example of a “Decentralized cooperation” (DC) is explained through
a four-stage procedure and figure 8 (Pazaitis et al., 2017):
1. An initial group of risk-taking individuals invest work and resources to
the DC to accumulate tokens, which represent the equity share in the DC.
At this point, the value of the tokens is purely speculative and depends
on the expected value of the products or services that the DC provides.
2. As the DC starts offering a certain product or service, the tokens can be
spent to the products and services. People can collect tokens either by
contributing directly to the DC operations or by purchasing them from
current token holders.
3. As the scale increases, the DC can start selling tokens to markets and the
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DC tokens eventually become redeemable in change of a specific amount
of fiat currency or other digital tokens. Over time, a dynamic exchange
rate is established amongst different types of tokens, which could lead to
the formation of a multilateral market of the DC tokens.
4. A price cap for the tokens is established to eliminate volatility. For in-
stance, if the DC has accumulated 1000 USD (over the course of contribu-
tions) and issued 10.000 tokens, each token earned from the contributions
will be redeemable for a value of 0.1 USD regardless of whether the mar-
ket price is higher or lower. If the market price is higher, people exchange
their tokens on the market rather than redeeming them. On the contrary,
if the market value is lower, people are incentivized to redeem their tokens
against the DC. As a result, the total amount of tokens in circulation will
drop, thus increasing the market value, up until the point in which the
market value will match the redeem value.
Figure 8: Decentralized Cooperation (Source: Pazaitis et al. 2017)
This sort of “decentralized cooperation” aims to coordinate and incentivize
the production and consumption in a decentralized manner. Pazaitis et al.
(2017) acknowledges that the blockchain based DC model is mostly theoretical
and rests upon a superficial understanding of how it could in practice apply to
real-world communities.
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Given the early stage of the technology, there is no robust empirical evidence
regarding the practical implementation of this model. However, blockchain has
proved to be able to facilitate distributed value systems (e.g. bitcoin) with na-
tive tokens representing a generic and measurable unit of value. This is why the
procedures to create new kind of value systems are worth taking a closer look
at.
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7 Discussion and Conclusions
The objective of this thesis is to provide an overview of the relevant published
work related to the economics of blockchain. The research question is “What are
the possible economic and institutional implications of blockchain?” In order to
answer the question, a comprehensive overview of the topic is gained through a
three-stage review process, which is explained in chapter 3 in more detail. The
list of the major contributions to the topic and key themes can be found in table
1 in chapter 2. The possible implications are analyzed through the viewpoints of
monetary and innovation economics and also from the governance point of view.
Rather than a single efficiency improving ICT, blockchain should be attached to
the larger context of the digitalization of the economy. Digitalization is shaping
the dynamics of governance, ownership, production, consumption and exchange.
Digital goods and services might be extremely beneficial and have high use
value, but simultaneously they might have low transaction value, making it
hard to incentivise optimal production. In addition, transaction costs and lack
of trust are partly bottlenecks of the expansion of digital peer-to-peer platforms.
Even though the technology is only taking its first development steps, it is clear
that blockchain has features that could contribute to the unlocking of the digital
economy’s potential. This chapter summarizes and discusses the findings and
suggests directions for the future research.
Monetary-Centered Approach
Blockchain can provide a technical infrastructure for designing new types of
monetary systems that could potentially disrupt payment or even monetary
systems (Bo¨hme et al., 2015). Whereas historically currencies were chosen from
among existing commodities, blockchain gives unprecedented flexibility to de-
signing the attributes of currencies (Gans and Halaburda, 2015b).
Bo¨hme et al. (2015) argue that blockchain is a social science laboratory for
monetary economics. Digital money, like blockchain-enabled cryptocurrencies,
gives flexibility to for example i) design and experiment various supply proce-
dures, ii) build in decreasing or increasing nominal value to the design of the
currency, or iii) incentivize certain kind of demand or production by designing
the currency to be more valuable in certain activities or geographical areas, for
example. These attributes can give entirely new tools for policymakers to design
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and implement incentive structures and monetary policies.
Private digital currencies might also generate economic efficiency gains for sev-
eral reasons. For example, international remittances, foreign exchanges and
portability and divisibility properties of digital money are identified as potential
sources of the blockchain enabled efficiency improvements (Dwyer, 2015; Peters
and Panayi, 2016; Dandapani and Dandapani, 2017). Simultaneously, the sup-
ply should be made credibly scarce in order for the private money to maintain
a positive value. In practice, this is created by coding an immutable supply
procedure to the algorithm. However, if the money supply of a currency is fixed
or decreasing, there might be deflationary pressure making it poor medium of
exchange (Bo¨hme et al., 2015).
Innovation-Centered Approach
The economic and institutional implications of blockchain will largely be af-
fected by the scope of the diffusion of the technology. Maximization of profits is
a powerful driver of technological change (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2011).
From the innovation viewpoint, potential profits gained from investments de-
termine the market-driven diffusion process.
Profits can be generated from two sources: cost savings through efficiency im-
provements and increased revenue through new marketplaces. The diffusion pro-
cess can also be partly driven by exogenous, non-price drivers, including public
support as well commons-oriented open source communities (Allen, 2016). In
the case of blockchain, the efficiency gain is likely to be realized through orga-
nizational efficiency rather than more direct gains, like more efficient transfer
of information. The declining production costs often derive from stripping out
layers of activity that are no longer needed (Davidson et al., 2016b).
Blockchain also enables new marketplaces to emerge, which might generate
profits and thus drive investments and technological development. Through
a more cost-efficient and decentralized monitoring of the market participants,
blockchain can facilitate exchange for items and services that were not efficient
enough to be exchanged previously (Catalini and Gans, 2016). This could be
the case in a market that requires a verification of trust and mechanisms to
monitor reputation and payment systems, but in which the transaction value
is low. In this kind of a situation, blockchain may be instrumental in creating
profitable business models.
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The concept of general-purpose technologies (GPTs) gives another interest-
ing way to study the technological progress and innovation. Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg (1995) suggest that GPTs are the ultimate source of productivity
increases, and thus, long-run economic growth. Even though it is hard to pre-
dict ex-ante which technologies will fulfill the definition of a GPT, blockchain
fulfill the three features of the definition: it is a pervasive technology which
has scope for improvement and innovational complementarities. Thereby, for
example Catalini and Gans (2016), Kane (2017) and Allen (2016) claim that
the blockchain technology has the key features to become one.
Governance-Centered Approach
In chapter 6, the ability of blockchain to provide new instruments to prove
economic interactions and decision-making are reviewed from the governance
viewpoint. According to Davidson et al. (2016b) blockchain can facilitate trust
for economies, where previously agents were technologically constrained to the
types of economic governance that could be generated only by firms, organiza-
tions, markets and governments. Spread of blockchain technology would thereby
imply a shift towards more decentralized and self-organizing economies. The
utopian views of blockchain argue that blockchain will disrupt every market by
eliminating the need for intermediation by facilitating trust. More realistically,
Catalini and Gans (2016) argue that blockchain is “more likely to change the
scope of intermediation” and to create new markets through the reduction of
transaction costs.
The basic insight from the governance viewpoint is that blockchain has po-
tential to facilitate a shift from firms towards markets. It can also decrease
the need for trusted intermediaries (Davidson et al., 2016a). This could imply
potentially more efficient use of economic institutions.
Even though the models of how blockchain could incentivize decentralized commons-
oriented production are still mostly theoretical, Pazaitis et al. (2017) argue that
the blockchain technology supports the polycentricity of value, fluid coordina-
tion and multiplicity of contributions in an inclusive joint production. This is
important in communities that create goods and services with low transaction
value but high use value like in many cases in the digital economy. Swan (2015)
and Crosby et al. (2016) also characterize blockchain as a society’s universal
record-keeping system. It could play an important role in unlocking the full
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potential of digital platforms.
Directions for the Future Research
The economic literature on blockchain is still in its infancy, but it is continuously
developing. However, currently even the clear definition and terminology are
lacking. This definitely creates challenges in accumulating scientific knowledge
on the subject and in establishing a meaningful regulatory environment around
it.
From the monetary viewpoint, the research on the different designs of cryp-
tocurrencies and digital currencies in general is highly interesting since it could
open up entirely new opportunities for creating economic and monetary poli-
cies for different purposes. Bo¨hme et al. (2015) state that blockchain should be
considered as a social laboratory for monetary policy. Indeed, there are many
possibilities which can be easier experimented with digital money. The possi-
ble subjects of research could be, for example, what would be the impact of a
currency that has a decreasing nominal value? What would happen if money
would have different value in different activities?
From the innovational viewpoint, the evidence of the profitability of the blockchain
business models is important for entrepreneurs to make investment decisions
and thus drive the development of the technology. As Zhao et al. (2016) state,
“business research in blockchain is found mainly at the conceptual level that
conceptualizes blockchain innovations in business and at the prescriptive level
that outlines business applications of blockchain”. Thus, research on the exact
source and dynamics of efficiency gains or the creation of new markets could be
beneficial.
From the governance viewpoint, the economic incentives of blockchain in joint
and open source production (like is the case with Backfeed) would also be ben-
eficial to study. This would enhance the understanding of how the production,
consumption and ownership in the digital knowledge economy should be orga-
nized in order to take advantage of its potential gains more effectively.
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